

beauty belongs to the former just as much as to the latter. Strictly speaking, it belongs to neither of them, but to their actual relation one to another, a nexus of subjective intention and objective material.

Aside from this matter of subject and object, I have found Professor Gotshalk's paper helpful and enlightening.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. NICOLAI HARTMANN. Berlin und Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1935. xvi + 322 pp. 8 M.

There is but little left of that promising, almost explosive evolution of German philosophy which immediately after the war gave new impetus to philosophical thought. The tempest has destroyed that development. Few philosophers of more than provincial importance are now active in Germany and more than one of these has suffered a break in his development. Nicolai Hartmann is not of this latter type; his new work is a sign of steady development and growth. He began as a student of Hermann Cohen and Natorp, as an adherent of the Marburg Neo-Kantian school. It was his good fortune to begin his studies in an atmosphere not too congenial to his true philosophical nature. For although he was at first won by the apparent consistency of the Neo-Kantian school, he later discussed it, thought it through, and thus came to a deeper conception of his own point of view than he could have reached without working through these impediments. Cohen considered himself, more or less legitimately, a philosophical descendent of Plato and found Aristotle completely unsympathetic. But there is no doubt that Hartmann is of the Aristotelian type. Like Aristotle, he seeks a method that could be called "higher empiricism"—empiricism because he is opposed to construction and to systematizing from the outside; higher empiricism because for him facts are not only individual physical, social, and psychical, but are also essences, ideal objects, categories, etc. A thinker of this empirical type could not remain long in the Marburg school, for which even "givenness" was a construction.

Surveying German philosophy, Hartmann found in the phenomenological method, as understood at that time by the phenomenological school of Munich, aid in freeing himself from Neo-Kantian idealism. The philosophers of the Munich school looked upon this method as a means, unprejudiced by construction, of approaching the facts to obtain a survey of their immense complexity. Natural realism

was the background for their phenomenology because natural realism is a frame of all experience of phenomena. But the ambiguity of the word "phenomenon" was very soon to prove critical for the development of phenomenology. The investigation of phenomena can mean that the facts as they are given to us immediately are the starting point of philosophy, and this is the view of the Munich school. But the fact that phenomena are always phenomena for somebody, that they are in relation to a subject, can also be emphasized, and this view is apt to lead to an idealistic position. Husserl indeed followed this interpretation in his *Ideas towards a Pure Phenomenology*, and in so doing, approached Neo-Kantianism. Nicolai Hartmann followed the alternate interpretation, leading away from Neo-Kantianism. In his first great book, *Metaphysics of Knowledge*, he analyzed the presuppositions of natural realism, and he retains this point of view in his new book, *Ontology*. In following out the various implications of natural realism, he necessarily met the problem of ontology.

Ontology is a long neglected philosophical discipline. The old tradition that follows from Aristotle through medieval scholasticism to Christian Wolff was broken by Kantian criticism. The doctrine of "Being as Being" had no place in idealism. According to Hartmann, an ontology that is not a mere construction must be based on direct grasping of the outside world and not on reflecting upon our acts, on the use, as he says, of the "*intentio recta*." Under the influence of Kant, the whole nineteenth century had taken a reflective attitude, used an "*intentio obliqua*" which has its place in psychology, logic, and theory of knowledge, but not in ontology. In this way thinkers of the nineteenth century confused epistemological and psychological with ontological problems and disregarded true ontology. Hartmann wishes a return to the use of the "*intentio recta*," but this does not mean that he wishes to continue the development where Christian Wolff left off. The nineteenth-century attitude may have been wrong, but it has sharpened the critical mind, found new problems and new possibilities of solution. These new instruments of criticism must be applied to the old problems and new, genuinely ontological problems must be discovered in all fields of human experience and human science, in ethical and logical problems, in history, in art, in psychical facts, and in the structure of the human spirit.

This first volume of Hartmann's *Ontology* clears the ground for the foundations of an ontology and at the same time outlines these foundations. Many prejudices and confusions are first eliminated, not only those of the more fashionable idealistic and restrictive empirical type, but also those that have found expression in outstanding

classical systems. One of the most fundamental of these confusions follows from inadequate distinction of "To be" and "Being." Every being *is*, of course. This statement seems trivial, but in spite of this, it has seldom been recognized as true. Substance is usually considered to *be* in a higher degree than attribute, thing than quality. But actually substance and attribute, thing and quality equally *are*. Thus, for example, appearance exists; we must not deny the fact of its existence, but discover to what species of existence appearance belongs. A second common confusion is the identification of "to be" with "to be real." Ideal existence (mathematical existence, for example) is therefore impossible for this theory. This identification has its origin in the prejudice that existence means real existence. On the other hand, others, as the Platonists, resolve every real existence into an ideal existence. Neither reduction is permissible, however. Every type of existence must be recognized in its own genuine ontological position.

Thus a great part of Hartmann's book is devoted to the task of distinguishing reality and ideality, of securing the existence of ideality, and of discovering the ways by which we experience the different types of existence. How, for example, do we experience reality? The usual answer is that we experience it by some kind of knowledge, by perception, by reasoning, etc. Hartmann demonstrates elaborately that this opinion is not justified. We also experience reality in acts which have nothing to do with knowledge—in pain and pleasure, in hope and fear, in expectation, in suffering, in contact with other people and with things, in will and action, as well as in the resistance that comes to us from the world. However, in spite of this, knowledge has an exceptional position and of this Hartmann is fully aware. But he is also aware that in every-day life the weight of reality is given us by emotional acts and feelings. In spite of this he objects, and I think with justice, to the one-sidedness of the thinkers who, under the influence of Kierkegaard, take the single emotional act, anxiety, ignoring most of the others and not only ascribe to it a specific value in the grasping of reality, but even give it a specific metaphysical dignity.

Ideal existence lacks this weight given by the acts of feeling. It is only approachable by knowledge. It is because of this lack of direct emotional impressiveness that ideal existence is so often overlooked by philosophers and is interpreted in terms of some other kind of reality. Or again, the concepts in which ideality (mathematical existence, for example) is given to us, force themselves upon us more strongly than ideality itself, and therefore ideal existence is often identified with conceptual ideality. But no such re-inter-

pretation is permissible. We must accept ideal existence as a specific type of existence.

Hartmann reveals, in excellent analyses, the different forms of ideality and their various relations to reality. Mathematical existence is a self-sufficient system, for the single objects within the system are connected with each other and can be derived from each other. This type of ideality can be intuited without reference to reality, by "conspective intuition" as Hartmann calls it. To find the ideal realm of essence on the other hand, we must return again and again to reality where the essences are embodied. Each essence must be discovered independently, by "stigmatic intuition." Thus the relations between these two forms of ideality and reality differ. Reality, for example, follows the laws of mathematical existence. If a triangle is realized, its angles must have the sum that mathematical laws prescribe. But this relation between reality and ideality does not hold for laws of value. Reality does not follow these laws. It may be of ethical value that a promise be kept, but it does not follow that if a promise *exists* in reality it is also kept in reality.

This discussion of reality and ideality would have been impossible for Hartmann if he had not clarified beforehand both the character of knowledge as a self-transcendent act and the relation of essence and existence. This analysis of the character of knowledge is directly connected with the previous analysis in the *Metaphysics of Knowledge*. Hartmann's treatment of the relation of existence and essence is, however, entirely new, and deals with one aspect of the problem from an original point of view. I have no doubt but that his discussion will become decisive for all further investigation of the problem. His fundamental distinction is not that between existence and essence, but between "*Dasein*" and "*Sosein*." Everything that *is* has both the character of "*Dasein*" and of "*Sosein*." It *is*, and it is in a certain way. Ideality as well as reality has existence ("*Dasein*") and has "*Sosein*" of this "*Dasein*." In making these simple discriminations, Hartmann opposes both those who maintain that we can only recognize the "*Sosein*" and never the "*Dasein*" (Kant), and those who maintain that we know the "*Dasein*" while the "*Sosein*" is unapproachable. For Hartmann, "*Dasein*" and "*Sosein*" are separated but they belong together and are relative to each other. Each "*Dasein*" is a "*Sosein*" of something else. That Socrates lived, that he had a "*Dasein*" was a "*Sosein*" of the population of Athens. The "*Dasein*" of the population of Athens is one moment of the "*Sosein*" of Greece and so on. But this series ends with the "*Dasein*" of the universe. The "*Dasein*" of the universe is not the "*Sosein*" of anything else.

Only some of the results of Hartmann's analysis can be mentioned here. His *Ontology* is a book that advances the discipline of ontology in many ways. No one interested in ontology can overlook it. I think, however, that the great value of the book lies not only in the novelty of its results, but in the method through which these numerous results are gained. The book shows a type of scientific seriousness to which most philosophers, professing science as their model, do not attain. Philosophy, to be sure, is full of clever speculation, good argument, and theories supported by facts. But I know of no one in contemporary philosophy who has as conscientious an analytic as this of Hartmann's in which every fact is followed to its conclusion, every systematic form grows out of the exact analysis of the facts and the problems.

An adequate discussion of Hartmann's results would require a painstaking and conscientious exposition of his views—argument after argument, fact after fact, which is impossible in this review. But it is at least possible to discuss briefly the philosophical point of view expressed in the book as a whole. What is the systematic position of Hartmann's *Ontology*? It purports to go "beyond idealism and realism" if these are taken to mean systematic points of view that precede ontological investigation. Hartmann shows that the usual idealistic and realistic theories make assumptions that are not justified by ontology. This does not mean that he himself is neutral to the question of idealism and realism. Natural realism, as I have already suggested, is a frame for his ontology, not because it is a point of view he prefers, but because it is in a certain way not a point of view at all. It is implicit in the unprejudiced facts of knowledge itself and is therefore the natural starting point of every philosophy. This is a principle that has been often overlooked, or, when not entirely overlooked, neglected soon after the preliminary steps in the construction of the system have been taken. But even if we agree with Hartmann that natural realism is a frame for ontology and the starting point for philosophy, must this starting point be taken also as conclusion? Must we be satisfied, for example, to accept ideal existence as final? Can it not be justifiably asked whether or not ideal existence is a creation of the mind and possibly reducible in metaphysical value to something else? Can there not lie beyond ontology a metaphysics that in no way invalidates the results of ontology, but serves as a background for them? Hartmann seems to answer "No" to these questions because, according to his conception of metaphysics, metaphysical problems are insoluble problems, that is to say, problems that have to do with the unknowable. But is it true, to mention only one of the many metaphysical problems, that the question of the way in which ideality comes into

existence is excluded by his ontology? These questions become even more critical if we lay stress upon a type of reality which Hartmann has neglected, namely, psychical reality. According to him, ontological results are found in "*intentio recta*" while those of psychological analysis are, on the other hand, found in "*intentio obliqua*." But what of the ontological characteristics of the psychical world? Must they also be found in the "*intentio obliqua*"? Or are the ontological characteristics of the psychical world the same as those of the external world? If this is the case, the "*intentio recta*" would be sufficient for their discovery. But how do we know without exploring the "*intentio obliqua*" that there are no other ontological characteristics of the psychical world? In his chapter on the modes of givenness, Hartmann does not mention the way in which psychical reality is given. His explanation of the way we experience reality in knowledge and emotional acts is based on the reality of the outside world. The whole difficult question of the experience of the inner world is only occasionally mentioned. But a closer investigation of the ontology of the inner world would perhaps lead to modifications of ontology and to new ontological concepts. Perhaps it might even show the necessity of giving up natural realism as the ultimate frame of ontology. But the discussion of such problems transcends the intention of Nicolai Hartmann's book. It does not purport to be a metaphysics, but an outline of ontology and as such, it is admirably clear and admirably suggestive.

M. A. G.

'ΑΝΑΜΝΗΣΙΣ *and the A Priori*. ALINE LION. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1935. 39 pp. 2/6.

In this small volume, the writer compares Plato's doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις* as expounded in the *Phaedo*, with Kant's doctrine of the *a priori*. She points out that both Plato and Kant are searching for an element in knowledge which is necessary, universal, and objective. Thus, Plato's forms perform, for experience, a function analogous to that of the *a priori*, according to Kant. Also, for both Plato and Kant, these elements may not be derived from experience. It is true that for Kant, there is no knowledge without perception; but it is also true, that in this life at any rate, the realm of forms (*ἐίδη*) may not be known without the intervention of experience.

The author exhibits commendable self-restraint. There is in any case no attempt to make out a thesis. If there are similarities, there are also differences. Kant arrived at his doctrine by way of criticising the metaphysical dogmatists; Plato (or Socrates) was primarily concerned with refuting Sophists, sceptics, and materialists.