

Chinese religion respectively, have been added to the previous thirteen dealing with the history of religion in Part I. The four chapters on the psychology of religion have been changed but little. The more specifically philosophical Part III has been augmented at many points to include such recent developments as Humanism and Russian Communism, but it could hardly be regarded as abreast of the last decade's developments in physical science. In spite of the admitted contemporary depression in religion "comparable to the moral and economic depression of the time," the author's view of its future remains incorrigibly optimistic, largely on the somewhat surprising ground that increasing intellectual inquiry into religious questions will lead to a wide acceptance of his own or similar views. This would entail a radical transformation in the rôle of the intellect in religion from destructive to constructive critic. One can not escape the impression that the years which have elapsed since the book's first edition in 1922 have placed the author increasingly on the defensive, or at least have made a persuasive exposition of his enlightened orthodoxy more and more difficult. One can hardly dispute in a paragraph the cogency of his central position concerning the nature of religion as the conservation of values through superhuman agency; but it may be suggested that he may have underestimated both the mutability of any one set of values, and man's disposition to utilize his own unaided capacities to reach them. Professor Wright's presentations of his own and rival opinions, however, remain not only scrupulously fair but also unfailingly genial and self-critical. As a compressed compendium of recent opinion on most of the philosophical issues raised by modern religion, and as a positive statement of a scholarly and carefully-considered point of view in both fields, this revised edition is likely to continue to rank high for many years to come.

H. A. L.

Scientologie: Wissenschaft von der Beschaffenheit und der Tauglichkeit des Wissens. A. NORDENHOLZ. München: Ernst Reinhardt. 1934. 112 pp. 3.80 M.

I do not know anything of the author of this little book, but I imagine he is living apart from the centers of official philosophy, and devotes all his free time to constructing his system. He has seen in his "Scientologie" many problems of knowledge with a clear and keen eye; but he has adopted the custom of so many autodidacts, of constructing more than investigating, of making assertions instead of analyzing. "The meaning of the beautiful is the liberation from the compelling force of individuation in the field of quality," or:

“Person and society, both of them have just as many rights as they can get out of the law of freedom”—those statements may be right or wrong, but they are not self-evident, and the mere assumptions given by the author do not satisfy a more sceptic mind. In addition to this, there is the creation of new words, at least a hundred of them (also the sign of an autodidact), which makes the reading of his book unnecessarily difficult. Therefore I believe that his book is more the personal expression of a thoughtful mind than a real progress in philosophy.

M. A. G.

Grundlegung zur Rechtsphilosophie. JULIUS BINDER. (Beiträge zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, 4.) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1935. x + 169 pp. 9.70 M.

This volume is a philosophical orientation for the forthcoming revision of the author's philosophy of law and at the same time an exposition of the reasons for that revision. It testifies to the manner in which he succeeded in overcoming the remnants of Kantian critical dualism with which his Hegelian idealism was tainted and also to his recognition of the need at this time for a defense of the unity and absoluteness of right in view of the popularity of “unphilosophical voluntarism” on the one hand and the attempts to distinguish between right and equity on the other. There is little new in his exposition; its value lies rather in its vigorous reassertion of orthodox Hegelianism in the face of recent departures among the idealists. After a general defense of idealism against realism and a reassertion of the Hegelian doctrine of freedom, he pleads for the inherent rightness of right. The following passage may serve as a summary:

The meaning of right lies in the immanent rationality and necessity of right. We conceive right to be rational, meaningful, and necessary, not by conceiving it as useful for this or that purpose, but when we understand that it follows necessarily from free will or human freedom. . . . The human will or human thought affirms right and validates it when it calls it “right,” recognizing it as the “rightful” consequence of its own free being. Right means nothing but the correct norm for human conduct. When I call a given discipline or system of norms “right,” . . . I realize its correctness, i.e., its necessity for the general will, which is also mine, hence, for my will and *my* bond to this general will. . . . Hence there is no sense in distinguishing right and morality. For the same reason there is no sense in distinguishing between correct and incorrect right, as Stammler does, or binding and not-binding right, as others do. We must realize the bindingness of right, of the only right we human beings know, the same in all its forms, in its actual, historical differentiation as the right of different ages and nations, changing yet ever maintaining its identity [pp. 129–130].

H. W. S.