Formal and transcendental Logic is the most important work on phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless, it has, in general, gained far less attention than theLogical Investigations and theIdeas on a pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy. In particular, the argument of § 1 of theLogic, namely, that it is fruitful to start with the meanings of the expression "logos" in order to develop a genuinely transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration. This paper takes a step towards filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing the argument of § 1 as a problem to which (a) solution(s) must be found: First, it offers an introduction to the problemper se, which is one of the relationship between speech and reason; second, it tries to bring the given senses of "logos" to a higher grade of conceptual clarity and distinctness than that in the text; third, it attempts to decide whether and how far these senses of the word can be documented according to principles of Classical philology; fourth, it endeavors to determine exactly the relationship between the meanings of "logos" in § 1 and the senses of "logic" in § § 1–107; finally, it strives to show that, with respect to the account of the relationship between speech and reason provided by Husserl in theLogic, there is, at best, a conflict and, at worst, a contradiction between the strategy outlined in § 1 and the tactics adopted in § 2ff. Throughout, the paper reads Husserl's "descriptions" as "arguments' for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting work in "Continental philosophy"." /> In the beginning was the logos - Heffernan George | sdvig press