Wesenserschauung). When Husserl established his theory of ideation for the first time in the Logische Untersuchungen, he hardly went beyond asserting the specific nature and irreducibility of those acts through which universals in contradistinction to particular things are meant and apprehended and, correspondingly, asserting the specific nature and irreducibility of the objects apprehended through the acts in question. For this purpose, Husserl had to engage himself in a thoroughgoing analysis and discussion of the theories of abstraction prevailing in the tradition of classical British empiricism." /> Gelb–Goldstein's concept of "concrete" and "categorial" attitude and the phenomenology of ideation - Gurwitsch Aron | sdvig press

Gelb–Goldstein's concept of "concrete" and "categorial" attitude and the phenomenology of ideation

Aron Gurwitsch

pp. 403-431


This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.

Not implemented yet !