sequence of conscious intentions, the latter is whole and complete in each conscious intention. Conscious intentionality is simply the "thereness' or Vorhandenheit of something for consciousness: though it is sustained by purpose, it is in itself utterly disparate from anything purposive or conative. It is the unique givenness of something to consciousness, its appearance in the light of consciousness, and this is the same whether what is thus apparent is perceived or thought of. The possible criminality of the Empress Agrippina may be as much vorhanden to consciousness as the telephone on my desk. I do not know whether Hintikka clearly differentiates this kind of pure cognitive appearance in his experience: it has eluded many, as for instance Heidegger. I think, however, that it is basic to the understanding of intentionality." /> Comments on professor Hintikka's paper - Findlay John Niemeyer | sdvig press