menschliche Subjekte in der seienden Welt setzen. Zum Schluss untersuche ich die Funktion der phänomenologischen Reduktion als die Möglichkeit einer radikal neuartigen Einstellung im Gegensatz zu einer bloßen Erste-Person-Perspektive innerhalb der natürlichen Einstellung.In this paper I sketch a systematic reconstruction of Husserl's fundamental concept of "attitude". I first explore Husserl's account with respect to the three faculties of intellect, will, and emotivity [Gemüt], which also define the three basic kinds of attitude. The attitude assumed by the subject plays at this level the important role of articulating and unifying, according to an overall direction, various underlying moments of a complex act. I then focus on the specific intellectual, viz. cognitive attitudes and highlight the difference between the naturalistic attitude (which characterizes the natural sciences) and the personalistic attitude (which characterizes the human sciences). I then consider the notion of the natural attitude and argue that the personalistic attitude represents the systematic core of it. The natural attitude may be defined as the human attitude, i.e., as the attitude in which subjects posit themselves exclusively as human subjects belonging to the world, which is itself unceasingly posited as being. In the final part of the paper I explore the function of the phenomenological reduction insofar as it opens up a possibility of self-understanding that breaks with the natural, human self-apprehension and discloses subjectivity in its transcendental dimension. This opens up a radically new attitude, the phenomenological, which should not be confused with a first-person perspective within the framework of the natural attitude." /> Systematische Überlegungen zu Husserls Einstellungslehre - Staiti Andrea | sdvig press

Systematische Überlegungen zu Husserls Einstellungslehre

Andrea Staiti

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