e mbedded', "e nactive', "e mbodied' and/or "e xtended' theories of cognition. Yet, crossovers between the two exciting developments are rare. Imagination does not lend itself, or so it seems, to a situated account. In what follows I propose that serious challenges notwithstanding, there are also reasons to think that these may not be insurmountable, at least not for all features of imagination. With the help of Husserl's phenomenological analysis of "phantasy' ("Phantasie'), i.e., sensory imagination, I highlight some of those aspects and begin to show how they might be accommodated by some strands (some e 's) of situated cognition. Imagination, I argue, is not as "off-line' as it might first appear." /> Imagination, embodiment and situatedness - Jansen Julia | sdvig press