Rational Fools (1977) have been of tremendous influence on the further development of the debate. In this paper, as well as in his later contributions to the topic, Sen largely relies on one conceptual tool to demonstrate the limitations of rational choice. The concept in question is commitment. Commitment, Sen argues, is a central feature of most domains of human behavior. And it cannot be accounted for, Sen claims, within rational choice theory. This chapter examines Sen's claim. Special attention is paid to the way Sen ties commitment to social identity. Moreover, it is argued that the most radical of Sen's claim, which even sympathetic interpreters tend to reject, makes sound sense if we consider the structure of joint action. The issue at stake here is Sen's claim that an adequate account of committed action requires us to go beyond what Sen calls the self-goal choice assumption. This is true in the most straightforward sense, I argue, if we consider the structure of collective goals." /> Beyond self-goal choice - Schmid Hans Bernhard | sdvig press