Logical Investigations takes account of this fact in speaking of the real and ideal determination of the subject. As embodied beings, we are subjected to real causal laws. Such laws, insofar as they relate to our mental contents, take these as determined by the contents temporally preceding them¹. As engaged in mind, we are also subject to the ideal laws of "authentic thought." These are nontemporal, logical laws governing "the compatibility or incompatibility of mentally realizable contents." In the Investigations, the problem of the mind's relation to the body comes to a head in these two determinations. How can the same set of mental acts be subject to both causal and logical laws? How can a causally determined subject grasp an apodictically certain set of logical relations ? As Theodor DeBoer puts this question: "on the one hand, these acts are empirically necessary and determined; on the other hand, an idea realizes itself in them through which they claim apodictic validity. How can both these views be combined ?"²" /> Real and ideal determination in Husserl's Sixth Logical investigation - Mensch James | sdvig press