Gemeingeist).In light of the findings of the previous chapter, we can now see in this chapter how Husserl, analyzing the interplay between Nature and Common Mind within the personal attitude, outlines a social ontology based on an insight regarding the correlation between a plurality of constituting subjects within a single world horizon on the one hand, and a plurality of constituted personalities and objects with cultural and mental predicates that are ontologically dependent upon social subjects on the other.Different classes of objects can be constituted only within a specific social framework. This has social-epistemological relevance: objectivity can be constituted only by members of social structures who strive for knowledge accessible to everyone.While in a naturalistic framework with a clear layer ontology (nature or matter at the bottom; everything else on top) a person is reduced to a bunch of properties of a spatiotemporal being, from a phenomenological clarification the exact nature of the natural sciences is the result of an implicit abstraction from the personalistic attitude, and therefore happens to be a peculiar social object with objective characteristics for an open scientific community.In this chapter I will show how this vicious circle can be avoided by becoming sensitive to the unintended and unnoticed changes of attitude. The mind-body problem arises only within an over-interpretation of the person restricted to the naturalistic attitude.Any naturalistic layer ontology distorts and shatters the unities of the higher ontological layers, forcing them into the ontological constraints of the founding layer, i.e. matter. Paradigmatically, social and cultural unities are reduced to mental faculties or states of individual subjects." /> Die plurale Konstitution der geistigen Welt - Caminada Emanuele | sdvig press