dynamis and energeia, and according to which there is always an open multiplicity of simultaneous "possibilities," the outcome of which remains undetermined. Since, according to Hartmann, reality suffers no indetermination, the Megarian conception of possibility is an account of real possibility, whereas the Aristotelian one is merely an account of epistemic possibility (Frédéric Tremblay)." /> The Megarian and the Aristotelian concept of possibility - Hartmann Nicolai; Tremblay Frédéric; Peterson Keith R; Peterson Keith | sdvig press

The Megarian and the Aristotelian concept of possibility

a contribution to the history of the ontological problem of modality

Nicolai Hartmann, Frédéric Tremblay , Keith R Peterson, Keith Peterson

pp. 209-223


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