open to its own (yet-to-be-known) future.1 Ignoring this difference has led to an industry of philosophical essays and neuroimaging studies that claim to access the first-person perspective when only able to access higher order self-referential judgments (for critical reviews, see Fuchs 2006; Legrand et al. 2003; Mishara 2007b). A similar confusion prevails in current approaches to classify types of autoscopy in the search for its underlying cognitive-neural mechanisms.2 Due to its descriptive method and resulting theoretical framework, phenomenology is in a unique position to contribute to the study of human self and its disruption in neuropsychatric disorders." /> Autoscopy - Mishara Aaron | sdvig press

Autoscopy

disrupted self in neuropsychiatric disorders and anomalous conscious states

Aaron Mishara

pp. 591-634


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