everything, but the laws of other sciences, including chemistry, are of restricted scope: their truth does not require their full generality. Since physical laws cover everything, including chemical systems and their parts, if possession of a chemical property confers genuine causal powers, this must be in virtue of some relationship that that chemical property bears to some property that falls under a physical law. But the mereological claim has bite only if determination can only flow upwards that is, if the completeness claim is true. Hence this paper is concerned with this second line of thought. In what follows I will first explore the role of the completeness claim in contemporary physicalism, and then examine some of the arguments offered in its support. A good way to examine a thesis is to consider a position which denies it. Hence emergentism which is committed to the existence of downward causation will occupy Section 2. In Section 3 I will apply C. D. Broad's characterization of downward causation to quantum chemistry, arguing that the molecular Hamiltonians standardly cited in spectroscopic explanations fit Broad's account of physical explanation rather than the physicalists'." /> Chemistry and the completeness of physics - Findlay Hendry Robin | sdvig press