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Synthese
Doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility
Vol. 194 (8)
Andrea Kruse, Heinrich Wansing (ed)
2667-2671
Introduction to the special issue "doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility"
Kruse Andrea; Wansing Heinrich
2673-2694
Believing intentionally
Steup Matthias
2695-2720
2721-2744
Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism
Nottelmann Nikolaj
2745-2762
Attitudinal control
McHugh Conor
2763-2784
Agency of belief and intention
Flowerree A. K.
2785-2810
On the analogy of free will and free belief
Wagner Verena
2811-2842
2843-2861
Remarks on the logic of imagination
Wansing Heinrich
2863-2894
Should have known
Goldberg Sanford C.
2895-2915
2917-2930
A hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance
Krämer Stephan
2931-2948
Wigner's puzzle and the pythagorean heuristic
McDonnell Jane
2949-2971
Inscrutability and visual objects
Phillips Ben
2973-3003
Virtuous distinctions
Fleisher Will
3005-3020
Why broad content can't influence behaviour
Gaukroger Cressida
3021-3046
A Russellian account of suspended judgment
Atkins Philip
3047-3067
Time, change and time without change
Warmbrod Ken
3069-3084
Two new objections to explanationism
Appley Bryan C.; Stoutenburg Gregory
3085-3100
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